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The Age of Entitlement: America Since the Sixties Paperback – January 5, 2021
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Christopher Caldwell has spent years studying the liberal uprising of the 1960s and its unforeseen consequences and his conclusion is this: even the reforms that Americans love best have come with costs that are staggeringly high—in wealth, freedom, and social stability—and that have been spread unevenly among classes and generations.
Caldwell reveals the real political turning points of the past half-century, taking you on a roller-coaster ride through Playboy magazine, affirmative action, CB radio, leveraged buyouts, iPhones, Oxycotin, Black Lives Matter, and internet cookies. In doing so, he shows that attempts to redress the injustices of the past have left Americans living under two different ideas of what it means to play by the rules.
Essential, timely, hard to put down, The Age of Entitlement “is an eloquent and bracing book, full of insight” (New York magazine) about how the reforms of the past fifty years gave the country two incompatible political systems—and drove it toward conflict.
- Print length352 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- Publication dateJanuary 5, 2021
- Dimensions5.5 x 0.9 x 8.38 inches
- ISBN-101501106910
- ISBN-13978-1501106910
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“One of the right’s most gifted and astute journalists”
— New York Times Book Review
"The Age of Entitlement is a work of history, not a work of sociological analysis. It does not conclude with a list of solutions or proposals. But this is no ordinary work of history. It engages and dazzles the reader in the way the histories of A.J.P. Taylor once did. Caldwell, as those who know his journalism and his 2010 book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe will know, has a marvelous talent for pointing out the unacknowledged contradictions and perversities in the outlooks of both left and right."
—Commentary
“American conservatism’s foremost writer… This is a heretical, unsettling work"
—The Irish Times
"The Age of Entitlement is an eloquent and bracing book, full of insight."
— New York Magazine
“Scholarly, provocative, insightful: this is history-writing at its best. Readers of Caldwell’s journalism will instantly recognize his capacity to use a single moment or event to illuminate a much wider phenomenon. Anyone wishing to understand the failure of the American elite over the more than half century since President Kennedy was assassinated, and thus why Donald Trump was elected, must read but profoundly thoughtful book.”
— Andrew Roberts, New York Times bestselling author of Leadership in War
“In this landmark cultural and political history of the last half-century, Christopher Caldwell brilliantly dissects the new progressive establishment, and shows how the reforms of the sixties gradually devolved into intolerance, self-righteousness, and the antithesis of what had started out as naive idealism. A singular analysis by a masterful chronicler of the sixties dreams that have gone so terribly, but predictably, wrong.”
— Victor Davis Hanson, author of The Case for Trump
“The Age of Entitlement rudely dismembers the moral pretensions of our ruling class in the tradition of Christopher Lasch. If the trajectory of political correctness leaves you bewildered, here you will learn its institutional logic—the key role it plays in legitimating new structures of inequality. Thanks to Caldwell, we now understand how this regime change happened, and why half the electorate thought it necessary to cast a vote of desperation in 2016.”
—Matthew Crawford, New York Times bestselling author of Shop Class as Soulcraft
“The sharpest and most insightful conservative critique of mainstream politics in years.”
— Publishers Weekly (starred review)
“A deeper, wider cultural and constitutional narrative of the last half-century... Caldwell’s account is indispensable — especially for liberals — in understanding how resentments grew... nuanced and expansive”
— Andrew Sullivan, New York Magazine
"A sweeping but insightful examination into every social, political and legal decision, movement and trend that leaves us where we are today in a polarized nation. ... a fascinating read that could ignite 1,000 conversations ... Caldwell’s analysis of our Vietnam legacy is particularly masterful but the book brims with brisk evaluations of how a confident nation became an argumentative, fragmented one."
— The Associated Press
"In all, a deeply felt, highly readable, and dead honest account of America since the 1960s and the terrible wrong turn we took then and continue to follow, disrupting what we used to call the American way, and leading to the increasing alienation of many of our most productive citizens, who believe they may be losing their country."
— The Washington Times
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
The assassination of Kennedy
In the mid-1960s, at a moment of deceptively permanent-looking prosperity, the country’s most energetic and ideological leaders made a bid to reform the United States along lines more just and humane. They rallied to various loosely linked moral crusades, of which the civil rights movement, culminating in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, provided the model. Women entered jobs and roles that had been male preserves. Sex came untethered from both tradition and prudery. Immigrants previously unwanted in the United States were welcomed and even recruited. On both sides of the clash over the Vietnam War, thinkers and politicians formulated ambitious plans for the use of American power.
Most people who came of age after the 1960s, if asked what that decade was “about,” will respond with an account of these crusades, structured in such a way as to highlight the moral heroism of the time. That is only natural. For two generations, “the sixties” has given order to every aspect of the national life of the United States—its partisan politics, its public etiquette, its official morality.
This is a book about the crises out of which the 1960s order arose, the means by which it was maintained, and the contradictions at its heart that, by the time of the presidential election of 2016, had led a working majority of Americans to view it not as a gift but as an oppression.
The assassination of Kennedy
The era we think of as the sixties began with relative suddenness around the time of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. Americans are right to say that nothing was ever the same after Kennedy was shot. You can hear the change in popular music over a matter of months. A year-and-a-half before Kennedy was killed, “Stranger on the Shore,” a drowsy instrumental by the British clarinetist Acker Bilk, had hit number one. A year-and-a-half after the assassination, the musicians who would form Jefferson Airplane, the Grateful Dead, Big Brother and the Holding Company, and various other druggie blues and folk-rock bands were playing their first gigs together in San Francisco.
This does not mean that the assassination “caused” the decade’s cultural upheaval. The months before Kennedy’s death had already seen the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (August 1962), which upended notions about science’s solidity and a lot of social and political assumptions built on it; Rachel Carson’s exposé of pesticides, Silent Spring (September 1962); and The Feminine Mystique (February 1963), Betty Friedan’s attack on what she saw as the vapidity of well-to-do housewives’ existence. Something was going to happen.
The two conflicts that did most to define the American 1960s—those over racial integration and the war in Vietnam—were already visible. In October 1962, rioting greeted attempts to enforce a Supreme Court decision requiring the segregated University of Mississippi to enroll its first black student, James Meredith. The last summer of Kennedy’s life ended with an unprecedented March on Washington by 200,000 civil rights activists. Three weeks before Kennedy was killed in Dallas, Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem was ousted and then murdered in a coup that Kennedy had authorized.
Kennedy’s death, though, gave a tremendous impetus to changes already under way. Often peoples react to a political assassination, as if by collective instinct, with a massive posthumous retaliation. They memorialize a martyred leader by insisting on (or assenting to) a radicalized version, a sympathetic caricature, of the views they attribute to him. The example most familiar to Americans came in the wake of Abraham Lincoln’s assassination in 1865, when the country passed constitutional reforms far broader than those Lincoln himself had sought: not only a Thirteenth Amendment to abolish slavery but also a broad Fourteenth Amendment, with its more general and highly malleable guarantees of equal protection and due process.
Something similar happened in the 1960s. A welfare state expanded by Medicare and Medicaid, the vast mobilization of young men to fight the Vietnam War, but, above all, the Civil Rights and Voting Rights acts—these were all memorials to a slain ruler, resolved in haste over a few months in 1964 and 1965 by a people undergoing a delirium of national grief. Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, was able to take ideas for civil rights legislation, languishing in the months before Kennedy’s death, and cast them in a form more uncompromising than Kennedy could have imagined.
Civil rights ideology, especially when it hardened into a body of legislation, became, most unexpectedly, the model for an entire new system of constantly churning political reform. Definitions of what was required in the name of justice and humanity broadened. Racial integration turned into the all-embracing ideology of diversity. Women’s liberation moved on to a reconsideration of what it meant to be a woman (and, eventually, a man). Immigration became grounds for reconsidering whether an American owed his primary allegiance to his country or whether other forms of belonging were more important. Anti-communist military adventures gave way, once communism began to collapse in 1989, to a role for the United States as the keeper of the whole world’s peace, the guarantor of the whole world’s prosperity, and the promulgator and enforcer of ethical codes for a new international order, which was sometimes called the “global economy.”
There was something irresistible about this movement. The moral prestige and practical resources available to the American governing elite as it went about reordering society were almost limitless. Leaders could draw not just on the rage and resolve that followed Kennedy’s death but also on the military and economic empire the United States had built up after World War II; on the organizational know-how accumulated in its corporations and foundations; on the Baby Boom, which, as the end of the twentieth century approached, released into American society a surge of manpower unprecedented in peacetime; and, finally, on the self-assurance that arose from all of these things.
The reforms of the sixties, however, even the ones Americans loved best and came to draw part of their national identity from, came with costs that proved staggeringly high—in money, freedom, rights, and social stability. Those costs were spread most unevenly among social classes and generations. Many Americans were left worse off by the changes. Economic inequality reached levels not seen since the age of the nineteenth-century monopolists. The scope for action conferred on society’s leaders allowed elite power to multiply steadily and, we now see, dangerously, sweeping aside not just obstacles but also dissent.
At some point in the course of the decades, what had seemed in 1964 to be merely an ambitious reform revealed itself to have been something more. The changes of the 1960s, with civil rights at their core, were not just a major new element in the Constitution. They were a rival constitution, with which the original one was frequently incompatible—and the incompatibility would worsen as the civil rights regime was built out. Much of what we have called “polarization” or “incivility” in recent years is something more grave—it is the disagreement over which of the two constitutions shall prevail: the de jure constitution of 1788, with all the traditional forms of jurisprudential legitimacy and centuries of American culture behind it; or the de facto constitution of 1964, which lacks this traditional kind of legitimacy but commands the near-unanimous endorsement of judicial elites and civic educators and the passionate allegiance of those who received it as a liberation. The increasing necessity that citizens choose between these two orders, and the poisonous conflict into which it ultimately drove the country, is what this book describes.
Product details
- Publisher : Simon & Schuster; Reprint edition (January 5, 2021)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 352 pages
- ISBN-10 : 1501106910
- ISBN-13 : 978-1501106910
- Item Weight : 9.1 ounces
- Dimensions : 5.5 x 0.9 x 8.38 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #36,036 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #28 in Civil Rights & Liberties (Books)
- #108 in Political Commentary & Opinion
- #671 in United States History (Books)
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About the author
Christopher Caldwell is a contributing editor at the Claremont Review of Books and a contributing opinion writer for The New York Times. He was previously a senior editor at the Weekly Standard and a columnist for the Financial Times. He is the author of The Age of Entitlement: America Since the Sixties and Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West.
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The starting point was Brown vs Board of Education. Rather than asking if schools could be separate but equal, the Supreme Court dismissed the question by stating that segregated schools were inherently unequal. The question then became one of freedom of association on equal terms. Blacks had to be granted the right to associate with whites. (The freedom of whites exclusively to associate with whites was ignored.) The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which applied to many public facilities besides schools, required the right to free association. A proportionate mix of white and black was required; if not, there was unequal association, therefore injustice. Public facilities of all kinds could always be found unequal in some way or other. Thus anxiety about inequality became a permanent condition, and was expanded to other groups besides blacks.
The 60s marked a heightening and expansion of the American outlook from the cramped outlook of the 50’s. The heroes were the veterans, who were eventually to hold 75% of US Congressional seats. The 60s seemed idealistic and focused on increasing personal freedom. The culture was also heavily male. In cities, a lot of old but serviceable buildings were torn down and replaced by dreary brutalist structures (for example, Government Center in Boston). Freedom for women expanded after two major Supreme Court decisions, Griswold vs Connecticut and Roe vs Wade, even if nominally they were about privacy. Abortion became an issue on the political reliability of judges. The constitutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court was put in question. Then came the ERA, which was highly favored at the beginning of the 70’s but faded. ERA promised to feminize public space just as Civil Rights Act promised to desegregate it. Now, the author explains (not very clearly) there was a sense of too much freedom; therefore in the 70s a hankering for rural, off-freeway America.
As we know reluctantly, the Vietnam war set America a large American goal that was disastrously lost. Originally Kennedy had planned to make an anti-communist state of Laos. American bureaucrats were sure they could build a Great Society in Southeast Asia. The war created a class division between the men who entered graduate or professional school and those who did not. Soldiers appeared as marauders and burners of villages. This had its impact on domestic politics. In Boston, school desegregregation through busing looked like a military campaign by well-off Bostonians against poor white neighborhoods. Privileged Americans took out of the Vietnam era an enhanced sense of moral authority. The people of South Boston were seen as part of the "basket of deplorables" and their future was to be overthrown.
The author points out that the 70s were a period of disillusionment from the late 60s. Reaganism shared to some degree the counterculture’s deepest aspirations. It was for conservative localist freedom against progress, favoring voluntary communities like South Boston over bureaucratically designed housing projects. But Reagan merely tapped conservatism. The return of power to communities never happened. Jack Kemp and later, Clinton promoted low taxes (promoted by Kemp, Jude Wanniski, and Arthur Laffer), high expenditures on Social Security and Medicare, and a big helping hand for minorities. The US dollar became the world's reserve currency. The Baby Boomers used their generational voting power to vote all of this into effect, arrogating the better-paid labor of future generations (who then were not old enough to vote), and trading it to other nations whose low-wage population gave us inexpensive products.
Social Security and Medicare were made more generous; there were expanded student loan programs and Pell grants. From an actuarial and human capital perspctive, the post-Reagan election years should have been easiest time to cut the budget, due to the large earning powr of Baby Boomers, but this didn’t happen. The wealth was spent on these expanding the new programs. As the author puts it, “The Great Society is the institutional form into which the civil rights impulse hardened.” More and more classes were icluded in the victim class, including other races, women, immigrants, Native Americans, .. .on and on.
The legally mandated outlays for civil rights, student loans and grants, grew incessantly, especially those for new programs, which courts assiduously worked to expand. The first major sign of this was the case of Nichols vs Lau (1974), concerning bilingual instruction in schools. The Supreme Court ruled that a school district was violating the 1964 Civil Rights Act if the children were not offered English instruction by their school district. By 1982 English instruction was offered in two forms, as a second language and as a bilingual program, but there were serious cost problems. The children were staying much longer in the bilingual program than appropriate. Similar cost-effectiveness problems occurred in other programs and in other cities. Boards of Education made many attempts to shut down bilingual programs, but they remained as a constitutional requirement.
Reaganism was a generational truce that cut some deadwood from government but not much. The exorbitant policy of using the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency and getting to write the rules of international commerce were outcomes that seemed uncertain when Reagan took office. Voters were unwilling to pay the taxes for Great Society programs, student loans, and Pell Grants. They were “too big to fail”. Their effectiveness was in dispute but an iron coalition of educ administrators and student advocates won’t let them be touched.
"Diversity" was something of a cult-word in the late 80s. The author finds one source of its popularity in the Bakke decision, as an alternative for "equality". But another more mundane explanation is the widespread business use of the computer, which made it possible to assemble a product out of many different sources and designs; he cites Banana Republic clothing, in some ways "authentic," in other ways not. A manufactured product could draw on materials from all over the world (even if they were really cheap and new) and from designers in all different traditions (even if they were bogus). In human relations on the job, if there was a perceived lack of diversity in employment arrangements or a lack of sensitivity, there was a ground for a civil rights complaint. The author sees Political Correctness (PC) as "an unwillingness to distinguish between institutions (which could be oppressive) and individuals (which could only be misguided.) (p.156). Understandably he makes no attempt to explain how we can determine the restorative action necessary to remedy a specific complaint, but in general the required action had to meet a high bar. Undoing court-ordered diversity would be difficult if it could be done at all.
The last chapter, "Losers", covers events in the last few years of this diversity/P.C. state, which the author sees as its culmination. Whites have been devalued to an inferior status, below "people of color": " ...when race rather than citizenship becomes the structure through which people accede to their rights, one must have a race, willy-nilly. And under the law, whites were "raceless". (p. 238). Rachel Dolezal, the white woman who successfully impersonated as black, was on her discovery attacked in the media for "passing" as black, as was Margaret Seltzer, a middle-class suburbanite who concocted a narrative about her life as a black female gang member. This was considered not funny, but a fraud. The publisher destroyed the entire print run of Seltzer's book. Then we have the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, who did not raise his hands and say "Don't shoot!" in his running attack on Officer Darren Wilson. In sum, whites were not allowed to joke about race in their own way or expect consistent standards concerning how people of color talked about them versus how they talked about people of color.
These incidents reveal a class division: Dolezal, Seltzer, and Wilson on one side, media moguls and judges on the other. It’s as if, absent a provable crime, we are never allowed to see minorities as demanding more than is warranted. I can only wander how far this can go.
This seems to me an extremely important book. The notes are very rich, referring to much related material of high relevance. There's a lot that for reasons of space alone, I've had to omit, even in this book of less than 300 pages, and only a few errors.
Standard, which to me wasn't that conservative, for instance David Brooks. He knows his neocons,
like Irving and Bea Kristol, James Q. Wilson, and Nat Glazer. He also is deeply into the Straussians,
like Leo Strauss, Harry Jaffa, Allan Bloom and Harvey Mansfield. The Straussians have reacted
differently to Trump (Bill Kristol leading the opposition), but here Caldwell seems to take a strong
position like Alan Keyes and Publius Decius Mus (Flight 93 Election). He is anti-anti-Trump at
least implicitly.
As Ross Douthat noted, liberals Ezra Klein and Michael Lind have also written on polarization, Lind
surprisingly endorsing some of the populist analysis of Christopher Lasch. For Caldwell, civil rights
is the hermeneutical principle for looking at the 60s to the present. A minority from Sen. Barry
Goldwater to Sen. Rand Paul has cautioned that civil rights causes problems, having nothing to
do with race but with our freedom to associate with anybody, or not to do so. But eventually
civil rights do cause identity problems, because white men, or straight white men, or whatever,
don't benefit from civil rights, and if they lose their economic advantage, they lose and are still
blamed for privilege.
Caldwell begins his narrative with the assassination of Kennedy, going through MLK and 1964 civil
rights to the 1965 immigration bill, which extended civil rights rubrics to third world immigrants.
The martyr JFK was succeeded by LBJ and the ambitious Great Society went further than JFK would
have. Then there was second wave feminism, which Caldwell traces from Betty Friedan to Gloria Steinem,
Kate Millett and Germaine Greer. Vietnam worsened the cultural polarization and even the peace
with honor couldn't cover up the loss and change in national morale. Caldwell's musical taste
leans apparently toward the Kinks, the San Francisco sound (Grateful Dead, Janis Joplin, Jefferson
Airplane) and punk (Sex Pistols, Patti Smith).
Nixon was a mild populist reaction to all this. Early on, Caldwell notes that VP Spiro Agnew's
speeches by Pat Buchanan and Bill Safire (e.g., on Vince Lombardi and football coaches being
a target of the left) were a populist foreshadowing, like Sarah Palin. Watergate worsened the
malaise begun by Vietnam. But overall, Nixon, Ford and Carter weren't all that significant for
constitutional policy, and neither were the Bushes and Clinton.
Surprisingly, Caldwell isn't a big fan of the Gipper. He tells the story of Reaganomics from Arthur
Laffer to Jude Wanniski to Rep. Jack Kemp. In Caldwell's view, Reagan didn't reverse the Great
Society, but paid for it by credit and ran up the deficit. Despite his populism for rural patriots, the
80s brought new titans of industry, as recorded by Tom Wolfe. These included Jack Welch, Lee Iacocca
and, as sort of a personality outlier, Donald Trump. The 80s prepared us for globalization and tech,
but largely by accident. Again, in Caldwell's narrative, Bush Sr. and Jr. and Clinton didn't cause
drastic shifts.
The brilliant Obama was not only a lawyer but a professor of constitutional law, and the author of
the radical but eloquent Dreams From My Father. He was the first President (although Clinton leaned
toward it) who applied the civil rights hermeneutic to the whole Constitution. There had been other
changes in the Constitution. Lincoln, like Kennedy, was a martyr, and the amendments went further
than Lincoln would have gone. There were the changes of Woodrow Wilson as George Will has
explained, and the year 1914 as Ron Paul explains in End the Fed. Then there was the managerial
revolution of FDR, as Jim Burnham explains. But in Caldwell's narrative, it's the civil rights hermeneutic
that really replaces the old Constitution. Race, gender and sexuality came to preoccupy everyone's
understanding of history, from Howard Zinn right down to the public school curricula.
Pres. Obama would say "this is who we are," but it was just a partisan Democrat position. Wokeness
came to dominate the 2010s with Black Lives Matter and Ferguson's narrative, demographic change
and gender fluidity. There were radicals like Ta-Nehisi Coates but also regular columnists like Charles
Blow of the Times. The 2010s were so out of control that other than Biden and a few others, the
Democrats seem to think that Obamacare wasn't enough big government.
I expected Caldwell to be a Weekly Standard neocon, but he engages genuine right-wingers like
Sam Francis, Peter Brimelow and Ann Coulter. I don't think he's into racialist theories, but he's
anti-anti-racist, or you might say he's against anti-white-racism. Or something.
The 2010s were also dominated by the gay marriage debate. Even for Obama, it was not politically
feasible in 2008. But Caldwell notes, why was Miss California Carrie Prejean attacked, when President
Obama wasn't? Because everybody knew he wasn't really against it. Obergefell was Scalia's last
great dissent, with the "mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie" and the suggestion to "hide my
head under a bag", but the serious point was about the undemocratic process.
Trump is not mentioned by name, only by cryptic references to a "NY real estate developer" and "this
continued until the election of 2016". The conclusion of the penultimate chapter is just clutch.
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