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Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East Paperback – June 3, 2003
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Though it lasted for only six tense days in June, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war never really ended. Every crisis that has ripped through this region in the ensuing decades, from the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the ongoing intifada, is a direct consequence of those six days of fighting.
Writing with a novelist’s command of narrative and a historian’s grasp of fact and motive, Michael B. Oren reconstructs both the lightning-fast action on the battlefields and the political shocks that electrified the world. Extraordinary personalities—Moshe Dayan and Gamal Abdul Nasser, Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin—rose and toppled from power as a result of this war; borders were redrawn; daring strategies brilliantly succeeded or disastrously failed in a matter of hours. And the balance of power changed—in the Middle East and in the world. A towering work of history and an enthralling human narrative, Six Days of War is the most important book on the Middle East conflict to appear in a generation.
Praise for Six Days of War
“Powerful . . . A highly readable, even gripping account of the 1967 conflict . . . [Oren] has woven a seamless narrative out of a staggering variety of diplomatic and military strands.”—The New York Times
“With a remarkably assured style, Oren elucidates nearly every aspect of the conflict. . . . Oren’s [book] will remain the authoritative chronicle of the war. His achievement as a writer and a historian is awesome.”—The Atlantic Monthly
“This is not only the best book so far written on the six-day war, it is likely to remain the best.”—The Washington Post Book World
“Phenomenal . . . breathtaking history . . . a profoundly talented writer. . . .
This book is not only one of the best books on this critical episode in Middle East history; it’s one of the best-written books I’ve read this year, in any genre.”—The Jerusalem Post
“[In] Michael Oren’s richly detailed and lucid account, the familiar story is thrilling once again. . . . What makes this book important is the breadth and depth of the research.”—The New York Times Book Review
“A first-rate new account of the conflict.”—The Washington Post
“The definitive history of the Six-Day War . . . [Oren’s] narrative is precise but written with great literary flair. In no one else’s study is there more understanding or more surprise.”—Martin Peretz, Publisher, The New Republic
“Compelling, perhaps even vital, reading.”—San Jose Mercury News
- Print length496 pages
- LanguageEnglish
- PublisherPresidio Press
- Publication dateJune 3, 2003
- Dimensions6.1 x 1.1 x 9.1 inches
- ISBN-100345461924
- ISBN-13978-0345461926
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“With a remarkably assured style, Oren elucidates nearly every aspect of the conflict. . . . Oren’s [book] will remain the authoritative chronicle of the war. His achievement as a writer and a historian is awesome.”—The Atlantic Monthly
“This is not only the best book so far written on the six-day war, it is likely to remain the best.”—The Washington Post Book World
“Phenomenal . . . breathtaking history . . . a profoundly talented writer. . . .
This book is not only one of the best books on this critical episode in Middle East history; it’s one of the best-written books I’ve read this year, in any genre.”—The Jerusalem Post
“[In] Michael Oren’s richly detailed and lucid account, the familiar story is thrilling once again. . . . What makes this book important is the breadth and depth of the research.”—The New York Times Book Review
“A first-rate new account of the conflict.”—The Washington Post
“The definitive history of the Six-Day War . . . [Oren’s] narrative is precise but written with great literary flair. In no one else’s study is there more understanding or more surprise.”—Martin Peretz, Publisher, The New Republic
“Compelling, perhaps even vital, reading.”—San Jose Mercury News
From the Inside Flap
Though it lasted for only six tense days in June, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war never really ended. Every crisis that has ripped through this region in the ensuing decades, from the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the ongoing intifada, is a direct consequence of those six days of fighting. Michael B. Oren?s magnificent Six Days of War, an internationally acclaimed bestseller, is the first comprehensive account of this epoch-making event.
Writing with a novelist?s command of narrative and a historian?s grasp of fact and motive, Oren reconstructs both the lightning-fast action on the battlefields and the political shocks that electrified the world. Extraordinary personalities?Moshe Dayan and Gamal Abdul Nasser, Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin?rose and toppled from power as a result of this war; borders were redrawn; daring strategies brilliantly succeeded or disastrously failed in a matter of hours. And the balance of power changed?in the Middle East and in the world. A towering work of history and an enthralling human narrative, Six Days of War is the most important book on the Middle East conflict to appear in a generation.
From the Back Cover
Though it lasted for only six tense days in June, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war never really ended. Every crisis that has ripped through this region in the ensuing decades, from the Yom Kippur War of 1973 to the ongoing intifada, is a direct consequence of those six days of fighting. Michael B. Oren’s magnificent Six Days of War, an internationally acclaimed bestseller, is the first comprehensive account of this epoch-making event.
Writing with a novelist’s command of narrative and a historian’s grasp of fact and motive, Oren reconstructs both the lightning-fast action on the battlefields and the political shocks that electrified the world. Extraordinary personalities—Moshe Dayan and Gamal Abdul Nasser, Lyndon Johnson and Alexei Kosygin—rose and toppled from power as a result of this war; borders were redrawn; daring strategies brilliantly succeeded or disastrously failed in a matter of hours. And the balance of power changed—in the Middle East and in the world. A towering work of history and an enthralling human narrative, Six Days of War is the most important book on the Middle East conflict to appear in a generation.
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
MORE THAN TWO YEARS HAVE PASSED since the outbreak of the latest Middle Eastern turmoil, and there is still no cease-fire in sight. Called by Palestinians the al-Aqsa Intifada, and by the Israelis the “disturbances,” the “events,” or, simply, the Palestinian terror, the violence that erupted in September 2000, and which has raged ever since, is in every sense a war. No less than in 1948 and 1967, Arabs and Israelis are today once again battling over the final disposition of the area known in Arabic as Filastin and in Hebrew as Eretz Yisrael—the Land of Israel. As in the processes leading up to previous Arab-Israeli confrontations, mounting violence between Palestinians and Israelis threatens to set the entire region ablaze.
In many respects, the current fighting resembles the civil war in Palestine
that broke out in November 1947, following the UN’s decision to partition the
country into independent Jewish and Arab states. The Zionist leadership accepted
the notion of territorial compromise, but the Arabs of Palestine saw no
reason to forfeit what they considered their exclusive national rights, and determined
to block the partition with attacks against Jewish settlements, road
systems, and neighborhoods. Other Arab forces, most prominently those associated
with the militant Muslim Brotherhood, aided the Palestinian Arabs from
across the border. The Jews, for their part, initially showed restraint, but in
April 1948, fearing annihilation, they too went to war. Subsequently, dozens of
Arab villages and towns were destroyed, their populations displaced, and their
leaders either killed or rendered ineffective. But the Palestinians’ defeat generated
sympathy throughout the Arab world and intensified the pressure on Arab
leaders to intervene against the Jews. The result came one month later with the
advent of the first Arab-Israeli war.
A remarkably similar process occurred more than fifty years later, in the
latter half of 2000, when the Clinton Administration again proposed to partition
the land between the Palestinians and the Jews. Specifically, the United
States called for the creation of a Palestinian state in virtually all of the West
Bank and the entire Gaza Strip—Israeli settlements would either be removed
or concentrated in blocks—with its capital in East Jerusalem. A small number
of Palestinian refugees would be repatriated to Israel; the rest were to receive
compensation. The Palestinian state would live side by side with Israel in relations
of full peace, but while Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak approved the
formula, the Palestinian Authority under its president, Yasser Arafat, rejected
it. Rather, Arafat demanded the return of all the refugees—a move that, if implemented,
would have created a Palestinian majority in Israel. As in 1947–48, the
issue was not merely the borders of the Jewish state, but its very existence.
The Palestinians consequently embarked on an armed offensive using tactics
reminiscent of those employed in 1947–48—roadside ambushes, snipers,
and car bombs—together with the innovation of suicide bombers. Militant Islamic
elements once more played a prominent role in the campaign. At first,
Israel’s reaction was again restrained, but as casualties rapidly mounted, the
IDF finally struck back. In April 2002, Israeli forces reoccupied much of the
West Bank, causing extensive damage to Palestinian cities and villages, and
killing or isolating many Palestinian leaders. As in 1948, the Palestinians’ plight
aroused sympathy in neighboring Arab countries and placed pressure on their
leaders to intercede. Soon Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon were launching
rockets into northern Israel; the Syrian army went on high alert, as did units in
Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. Israel mobilized its reserves. The region careered toward
yet another Arab-Israeli war.
The fighting in 2000–2002 recalled not only the events of 1947–48 but,
even more poignantly, those of 1967. That war, this book asserts, was the result
of a series of incidents triggered by Palestinian guerrilla raids and Israel’s
retaliations against them. Today, more than three decades later, the Middle
East is still in the grips of a context of conflict in which a single spark can ignite
a regional conflagration. Such a spark was kindled in September 2000, when
Ariel Sharon, then head of Israel’s parliamentary opposition, paid a visit to the
Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount, in Jerusalem.
Though the visit had been cleared with the Palestinian Authority, many
Palestinians viewed it as a provocation and protested against it violently. Firing
on the rioters, Israeli forces provided the pretext for launching an intifada, or
popular uprising, named after the Haram’s al-Aqsa mosque. Mass demonstrations
of Palestinian youths soon escalated into armed attacks against Israeli
targets, most of them civilian, and increasingly fierce countermeasures by Israel.
Israeli reprisals in turn instigated unrest in adjacent Arab countries. The
“street” was once again agitating—a déjà vu of 1967—and Arab rulers had little
choice but to act.
Unlike in 1948 and 1967, however, war between Arabs and Israelis did not
erupt in 2002. Though the region has remained in many ways unchanged, several
fundamental transformations nevertheless have combined to mitigate the
dangers of war.
There is, firstly, the existence of peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and
Israel and Jordan. In spite of their failure to bring about any true reconciliation
between their signatories, these agreements have nonetheless provided the nations
with open channels of communication and venues for reducing tensions.
Another change is the emergence of the U.S.-Israeli alliance that not only guarantees
Israel a decisive military edge over its enemies, but also affords Washington
far-reaching influence over Israeli actions. Finally, there is the nonconventional
weaponry now in the arsenals of virtually every Middle Eastern state, which has
sharply elevated the stakes in any Arab-Israeli confrontation.
Yet for every change curtailing the chances of war, another could equally
contribute to its outbreak. Absent today is the peculiar stability engendered by
the Cold War, of a rational counterpart whom the U.S. president might hotline
in a crisis, and superpower constraints over key regional players such as Iraq,
Iran, and Syria. The once neat division between Arab radicals and Arab conservatives
has been replaced by internal fissures within each Arab country—between
each regime and its domestic, often Islamic, opposition—and even the
lines in the Arab-Israeli conflict have become obscured. Most destabilizing,
arguably, is the growth of terrorist organizations, global in outlook and adamant
in their theology, transcending all borders and contemptuous of any attempt
to restrain them.
These countervailing changes, coupled with the continuing friction surrounding
nondemocratic Middle Eastern regimes and Arab resistance to the
very idea of a Jewish state, might have set the stage for an Arab-Israeli war
bigger and possibly more destructive than those of 1948 and 1967. Instead, war
in 2002 was averted by the timely intervention of the United States. As tensions
in the region spiraled toward an explosion, President George W. Bush
strongly advised Syria to rein in its Hezbollah allies and told the Palestinian
Authority that its support of terror was totally unacceptable to Americans. At
the same time, Washington publicly recognized Israel’s right to defend itself
and convinced Israelis that they did not stand alone. Bush’s actions—admonishing
the Arabs and reassuring the Israelis—were precisely those that Lyndon
B. Johnson failed to take in 1967, and in 2002 they succeeded in containing, if
not defusing, the crisis.
Like Johnson, Bush was engaged in an international struggle with an implacable
enemy—no longer communism, of course, but Islamic extremism—
but rather than tie his hands as Vietnam once had Johnson’s, America’s new
conflict impelled George Bush to act. The events of September 11, 2001, spurred
a radical departure from long-standing American policies toward the Middle East.
Having become the victim of large-scale Arab terror, the administration voiced
newfound empathy for Israel and its struggle against suicide bombers and gunmen,
and went so far as to identify Israel’s enemies—Hamas and Islamic Jihad—
as America’s. Moreover, in declaring war against international terrorism, in
dispatching its soldiers thousands of miles to fight in Afghanistan and, avowedly,
in Iraq, Washington could hardly deny Israel the ability to strike back in
the West Bank and Gaza, its own backyard. Concomitantly, American leaders
expressed severe reservations regarding the Arab states, even toward their traditional
allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, citizens of which were heavily implicated
in 9/11. Relations between the U.S. and the Arab world were further
strained by the Arabs’ reluctance to support a military effort to invade Iraq and
oust its dictator, Saddam Hussein.
The success of Bush’s effort to rally an anti-Saddam coalition is not, as of
this writing, guaranteed. Numerous obstacles, domestic and foreign, stand in
the president’s way. Nor is it certain whether the toppling of Saddam will install
democracy or merely another dictatorship in Iraq, or whether war in the
gulf will ultimately enhance or further impair the area’s stability. One fact,
alone, is incontestable: that the Middle East remains a flash point of multilateral
confrontation, a source of seemingly intractable controversies, and a powder
keg that the slightest spark could ignite. A context of conflict continues to
seize the region, demanding of its leaders almost constant displays of both courage
and caution.
November 2002
Product details
- Publisher : Presidio Press (June 3, 2003)
- Language : English
- Paperback : 496 pages
- ISBN-10 : 0345461924
- ISBN-13 : 978-0345461926
- Item Weight : 1.08 pounds
- Dimensions : 6.1 x 1.1 x 9.1 inches
- Best Sellers Rank: #28,161 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
- #47 in Middle Eastern Politics
- #65 in History & Theory of Politics
- #70 in Israel & Palestine History (Books)
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So, given that the account is scholarly and balanced, how does the book read? I was pleased to note that the author, Michael Oren, is an accomplished storyteller and the book mostly reads with all the spice and excitement of an early Tom Clancy novel. It flashes back and forth from the battlefield to the governments to the man on the street. More time must be spent on Israel, naturally enough, because the decisions were made by committees (when not made ad hoc on the battlefield). It takes some time to describe the arguments. In contrast, the facts that Egyptian decision-making structure was essentially non-existent, and that Jordan was an absolute monarchy, meant that there was little to report about internal politics in those countries. Oren is also adept at keeping an enormous cast of "characters" alive and in play - I never felt at a loss, even though this is the only book I've read on the conflict and was not even alive in 1967.
This brings me two the first of my two criticisms of the book: there is not enough material on the actions of Syria and her government. Although Syria didn't do all that much fighting, they were certainly involved in both the diplomatic and military efforts. Even so, after having read the book I couldn't tell you the name of a single Syrian leader or general off the top of my head. This is is stark contrast to the amount of time spent in the Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Amman. The second shortcoming is the length of the narrative describing the diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis before the shooting started. Although necessary to fully describe the history of the conflict, did we really need to be told about every phone call between President Johnson and the Soviets? Every diplomatic overture from the U.N.? As such, pages 100-200 drag somewhat. We are ultimately rewarded by the quality of the narrative once the war begins, so ultimately it is worth the slog through the diplomacy.
After an introduction which traces the Israeli-Arab conflict to the 1960s, Oren starts unrolling the events that lead to the outbreak of the war - namely, the boarder clashes between Israel and Syria, the attacks by Palestinian Militants (or terrorists, or revolutionaries, take your pick), and the counter attacks (or raids, or Imperialistic demonstrations of power) by Israelis.
The crisis took an escalation with the evacuation of the United Nation Emergency Force from Egypt, thus closing Israel's red sea port, and the movement of Egyptian forces into the Sinai desert.
Oren's description of the political forces at work, going back and force from Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Moscow and Washington DC (with stops at Amman, Paris and the UN headquarters in New York City), is nothing short of masterful. He describes how internal power struggles within the Arab world and within Egypt moved Egypt towards a confrontation with Israel and the Unites States, and how political forces within Israel, as well as a wish to maintain close relationships with the US ruled Israeli political movements.
I was struck by the major role U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations played in the conflict. By pulling the UN forces from the straits of Tiran that rapidly, Thant boosted Egyptian's pride. Had Thant stood up to Nasser, perhaps the war could have been evaded.
Equally interesting is Oren's depiction of US President Johnson, heavily involved in the much criticized war in Vietnam, unable to give Israel the support that it asked for - and thus, in the eyes of the Israeli leadership, giving it the green light to strike.
The attack, launched by Israeli airforce on the 5th of June 1967, caught the Egyptian unaware. Israeli operation Focus, the destruction of Egyptian air fields, was a resounding success. In a way, the war was already won.
The greatest weakness of Oren's account is in the description of the military operation. Frankly, they were so confused, with hardly any maps, that I don't think you can understand much about the ground level events of the war, or about the military strategy at all the levels except the highest, unless you already know a great deal about it beforehand.
This fault, however, does not really mar this otherwise excellent account, which goes on to describe the mix of responses in the Arab world, both desperation and euphoria (due to the phantasmagorial propaganda), the accusations that the US aided Israel (what Johnson called 'The Big Lie'), and the unfortunate attack on the USS Liberty by Israeli forces (Which Oren convincingly demonstrates was an accident).
Most interesting, Oren describes the attempt to secure a cease-fire, and Israel's attempts to duck, delay and win time. After trying hard to avoid the war, Israeli leaders were unwilling to end it without a major change in the political landscape - the conquest of vast territories in the Sinai desert, the West Bank, and the Goal Heights.
I was also amazed to read about the complete lack of strategic planning in the side of Israel. While military plans were finely drawn and perfectly executed, there was apparently no thought at all given to the goals of the war, beyond a somewhat naive wish to expand Israel's boarders and repay the Arab aggressors. Decisions such as weather to conquer East Jerusalem, to cross the tunnel, or to invade Syria, were done on the spur on the moment. Worse, they were often carried out not by the Government, but by the whims of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.
This is perhaps the most extraordinary revelation I had while reading Oren's book - that Dayan, and virtually Dayan alone, decided almost all the important decisions of the war. Not Prime Minister Eshkol, not the Israeli government, and not the international community made the decisions. For better or worse, almost everything in the modern Middle East is the consequence of the solitary decisions of Moshe Dayan.
Almost four decades later, in the middle of yet another wave of Israeli-Arab violence, I find that highly troubling, but strangely Ironic, and I fear that, in this regard at least, little has changed. In the event of an all out war, will the next forty or fifty years be decided by one charismatic leader in the Israeli cabinet?
Top reviews from other countries
A very good reference book for those who pursue middle east and it's violent history.